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CAN AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES KEEP PACE?
FRANK E. HoRAcK JR.*

The great industrial and technological advance of our society has
been founded upon the assumption that a product or a process can
be improved. The same assumption has seldom been applied to the
product or the process of government. This juxtaposition has often
led to the easy conclusion that we should apply industrial techniques
and scientific method to the governmental function. Without a doubt
the cold application of such methods to government would produce
many improvements; but so long as government is founded upon
representative concepts, criticisms of inefficiency, bureaucracy, incompetence, and ineffectiveness must meet the challenge that if the people
really want improvement they have the capacity to achieve it.
There are other obstacles, too. The scientists may control their
experiments in the laboratory, but the lawyers and the social scientists
have no testing ground but society itself, and if their predictions are
inaccurate the entire society feels directly and immediately the consequences of their errors. Thus, caution on their part is understandable
and resistance to accept change is but a product of the law of selfpreservation.
Scientists fought against this same traditionalism in their fields
and emerged victorious; but with few exceptions lawyers and social
scientists have preferred the quieter waters and have seldom ventured
into the turbulence of governmental reorganization and reform.
Nevertheless, there has been a recurrent demand for change in governmental processes and particularly those which involve the legislative
function.
The proposals which have received the greatest popular support
have been those which have sought to restrain government. The great
constitution-making and amending period, from 1850 to 1880 saw
provision after provision inserted for the express purpose of limiting
governmental and primarily legislative power. This popular distrust
of government is a characteristic and healthy attribute of American
society, but it can well be questioned after one hundred years of experience whether these restrictions have helped or hindered the cause
of popular control of government. In the last decade a resurgent
interest in "improving the legislative process" has found expression
in legal periodical literature, the political science journals, in government reports, and in statutory and constitutional enactments.
*Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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Most of these proposals have received little public support; most
of them have been formal and structural; most of them fail to recognize
that the legislature is an integral part of a total governmental process;
most of those which have been adopted have had little or no effect
upon the legislative process or its product. Thus, to add to this literature is an uninviting and hazardous task. Consequently, the material
which follows is presented not as tailor-made solutions but rather as
a series of issues to be considered before any change is contemplated.
The defect of most proposals for change has been the assumption
that alteration either in the composition of the legislature or in its
procedure will produce important and substantial improvements in
the legislative product. This improvement will not occur unless
there is a deep-seated and firm conviction in society that the legislative department is responsible for and capable of making the change,
that such change is desirable, and that it is worth while to make the
attempt. No proposal will succeed unless it has the vigorous and
whole-hearted support of the leadership of a particular state. Even a
poor proposal will succeed if a majority has the determination to
make it successful. In short, if a state believes that its governmental
processes should and can be improved, almost any change will succeed; but if the change is made without popular support and upon the
assumption that failure is inevitable, that surely will be the result.
If change is desired a catalog of legislative experiments will be a
useful tool for those who believe that improvements are possible.
These experiments can be more effectively classified in terms of their
objectives rather than in terms of their mechanics. So stated they are:
1. Leadership is the greatest legislative need.
2. The legislative function cannot be exercised properly with
sessions limited in time.
3. Legislative procedure prevents the enactment of necessary
legislation, or permits the passage of undesirable legislation.
4. The legislature attempts to regulate too much.
5. The absence of complete records makes the legislative process
unreliable.
The resolution of these questions can be achieved only by detailed
studies within a given state-not by logic, law or science. In government as nowhere else, the popular will, not perfection, is the ultimate
yardstick.
LEADERSHIP

The success of any organization, private or governmental, depends upon its ability to maintain leadership. Critics of the legislative process often suggest that new methods for the selection of representatives be adopted or that new and better persons be attracted as
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candidates, thereby implying that present personnel is inadequate for
the task of representing the people. These proposals usually recommend redistricting, reducing the number of legislators, an increase
in legislators' salaries, or the extension of social security to legislators.
None of these proposals attacks the fundamental issue: Is present
legislative leadership insufficient? All of the evidence indicates that
the responsible committee chairmen, the political leaders of the legislature, possess equal leadership ability with men in comparable positions in industry, the judiciary, and the professions.
The real issue is the direction of leadership which we expect of
our legislators. Many believe that the most desirable legislative goals
are inaction, on the assumption that inaction keeps down taxes, reduces
bureaucracy, and achieves a Spencerian simplicity in government and
society which they philosophically desire. Others believe legislative
inactivity reduces party responsibility and thus lessens the risk of
defeat in future elections. Others feel that legislative leadership
implies the serious and continuous review of all governmental operations and the responsibility for change as social and economic conditions require. Thus, on fundamental policy questions the issue
of legislative responsibility is usually not one involving the quality
and ability of legislators but rather it is one of political philosophy and
political responsibility.'
Legislative leadership, however, involves many questions besides
the basic policy issues which society itself must determine. Frequetly, the demand for improved legislative personnel reflects the
need for improvement in the quality of statutes and in legislative
procedure. These demands assume that improvement must come from
the legislators personally. This is almost always untrue. Legislators
can provide only the leadership, and the appropriations, to achieve
these results. An elected representative, -no matter what his qualifications may be, cannot be an expert on all of the complicated and
technical problems that are presented to the legislature. Indeed, the
more expert he is on one subject the less likely he is to be expert on
all others, for indeed that is the very nature of specialization. Thus,
to demand that the elected representatives be experts is to demand
both an unattainable and an undesirable goal. The qualities that the
legislator should have are courage, leadership, common sense, a desire
to represent his constituents, and an awareness that expert assistance
is necesary if he is to successfully discharge his responsibility.
No one expects the judge or lawyer to be an expert on matters
of medicine, engineering, agriculture or business practice; but every'For a detailed exploration of the problem see the brilliant article by Marx,
Legislation, Representation, and the Party System, 14 U. oF Prr'r. L. REv. 151
(1953).
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one expects the lawyer to present expert witnesses and the judge to
consider carefully all expert testimony. No more and no less should
be expected of the legislator.
But legislative leadership may often be effectively expressed
through the selection of the non-elected legislative personnel. They
have three functions: (1) providing protection and communication
for the elected members, (2) providing technical aid for the procedures of the two houses, and (3) giving expert opinion on legislative
proposals. The first function involves relatively unskilled appointees
such as pages, doorkeepers, receptionists and mail clerks. They are
usually appointed for personal or patronage reasons and inasmuch as
their work does not materially affect the ultimate legislative product,
further discussion of their part in the legislative operation is unnecessary.
Personnel for the second function is also selected, as a general
rule, on a patronage basis. They include the secretaries, typists, proofreaders, and journal clerks. Considering that their employment is
for but a few months in each biennium it is amazing that persons of
any competence can be acquired at all. Their acquisition for so short
a period and for such modest compensation is a real tribute to the
legislative process and to the political parties which procure them.
There are areas, however, where the legislative process would be
materially improved by more skilled personnel. The average house
journal is a sketchy summary of action taken or refused. Complete
transcripts of legislative debates are unrecorded. Committee hearings
go unreported. State legislatures need and should be willing to pay
for an adequate corps of secretaries as competent as the best Congressional reporters.
Real leadership requires vision to anticipate need, the courage
to fulfill those needs either directly or by delegation, and the assumption of responsibility for the results. Nowhere has legislative leadership failed so universally as in its inability to recognize the need for a
highly trained non-elected staff of technical assistants. Unlike Congress
where each important standing committee has its own experts, each
legislator his own office staff, and each house its own legislative
reference bureau and the assistance of the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service and of all the administrative agencies, the
average state legislature has only one over-worked and under-paid
legislative reference bureau.
In most states the legislative reference bureau 2 is inadequate. A
2
1n Colorado, for example, the bureau is placed in the Attorney General's
offices. It is composed of a director and a secretary and not to exceed five stenographers. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 74, §§ 20-29 (Vol. 3A 1952). Appropriations for each
of the past two fiscal years for personal services have averaged slightly in excess of
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majority of its staff is employed only for the duration of the legislative session. Inasmuch as it is traditional that the bureau's services
are available to every legislator, it is either deluged with trivial requests
for unimportant bills or it is ignored. Major policy bills where the
bureau could render invaluable service if properly staffed are seldom
if ever referred to the bureau unless it is for "courtesy clearance."
As a result, except for Wisconsin, the legislative reference idea has
never made significant and sustained contributions to the quality of
state legislation.
Other state services are also at the disposal of the legislature.
Either by statute or tradition the attorney general's office has provided
part time legislative assistance.3 Although this has been valuable on
questions of constitutionality, it has not contributed expert aid to
the formulation of important policy decisions. Subject matter experts
are seldom available in the attorney general's office, and thus it should
be expected to provide no more than "legal opinions."
To provide adequate time for the technical study of proposed
legislation and to procure qualified experts, some states have. established legislative councils. 4 The membership of the council is usually
divided equally between representatives of the house and senate with
bi-partisan participation assured. The council serves as an interim
committee to study the potential problems facing the next session of
the legislature. Although this organization seems to insure legislative
leadership of a high order, the results, with a few notable exceptions,
have been disappointing.
The uncertainty that its members will be reelected to the next
legislature has often been advanced as the reason for the legislative
council's limited effectiveness. Usually this explanation is untrue. The
real reason usually is that the leadership potential of those who have
served on the council is so great that they quickly overshadow their
fellow legislators who have not had the opportunity to acquire the
specialized knowledge available from the intensive studies of specific
state problems.
This fear of the power of the council members has resulted in the
appropriation of such modest sums that few if any intensive studies
are possible. 5 Likewise some council members fail to appreciate the
S10,000 and is nearly $15,000 for the current year.

Although appropriations are

increasing they still are grossly inadequate if the duties specified in Section 26,
supra, are to be successfully performed.
'In Colorado, however, the creation of the bureau was to "...
relieve the
attorney general's staff as it is now constituted, from the undue interference with its
regular functions .. " COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 74, § 20 (1935).
'Such a council was established in Colorado in 1953. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 74, §§
37-45 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
It is hoped that the Colorado council will share the
success of the council of its sister state Kansas.
6
The appropriation in Colorado for 1953 for "personal services, maintenance
and operation, capital outlays and other expenses" was but $12,500. Colo. Laws
1953, c. 9.
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need for thorough studies by experts, believing that an "inspection"
by committee members or a report prepared by an agency will provide
all the information necessary. There is also the fear that the public
will view with suspicion any appropriation of money for "studies"a fear not without foundation if previous appropriations have gone
for "expense accounts" and if the "experts" employed have no qualifications other than their political affiliation. In short, the desire to
maintain political equilibrium between the two houses and among
their members, coupled with fear of appropriating money has prevented the legislative council from leading the way toward effective
research into important legislative problems.
The suggestion has been made that if interim commissions composed of non-legislative members were substituted the political difficulties might be removed. Such a proposal, however, would be unsatisfactory to both political parties. Ideally, the collection and
analysis of data by experts should have no political implications; but
realistically, such activity can challenge party programs, endanger
administrations, and defeat prospective legislators. Where such nonelected commissions have existed, it is noteworthy that they have been
either inactive or have limited their studies to non-controversial studies
in the political sense.
Thus, in general, state legislatures, except for the assistance which
lobbyists provide, decide the important issues of legislation without the
aid of economists, public administrators, lawyers, or the experts in
the innumerable subject matters with which legislatures must deal.
Not until the public insists upon and supports legislation based upon
full knowledge and experience, will the state legislatures achieve a
position of respect comparable to that of the Congress.
An untapped resource for such assistance is the expert personnel
in the colleges and universities. The services of such experts, however, have been sought in the past without remuneration and without
reducing full time obligations already incurred by this personnel.
Furthermore, legislative leaders have failed to protect the experts
from the pressures and abuse of politics. It is therefore understandable that the experts have been unwilling to offer their services when
their only compensation has been personal attack and vilification.
The reasons for this situation are understandable. They result
from a failure to distinguish between the job of the expert and the
job of the legislator. It is for the expert to determine the facts, to
draw conclusions, and to evaluate and to recommend. It is not the
job for the expert to determine policy. It is the job of the legislator
to decide the policy questions and to protect the expert if he has
stayed out of politics. In this situation the legislator has the obligations of a judge. He must hear the evidence, weigh the conflicting
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claims, and determine the policy on the basis of informed expert
opinion balanced against the political considerations which society
expects. If there is leadership enough in the legislature, then the
expert function and the policy function can be kept separate, and
the public assured that ultimate decisions and ultimate responsibility
rests with its elected representatives.
Finally, if courageous legislative leadership is available, the lobbyist can be an invaluable aid to the success of the legislative process.
Made responsible for his statements and opinions, he provides interest
group representation without a formal and undesirable change in
the basis of selecting legislative representatives. The responsible
lobbyist will provide in committee hearings the facts and data necessary
for the proper development of a sound legislative program if the legislative committee insists upon the presentation of reliable evidence.
Thereafter, the committee's staff must determine its reliability and the
committee must decide its relevance and persuasiveness. Thus if the
legislator has the wit and the courage of leadership he can synthesize
all the skills and opinions necessary to make the legislative process a
dynamic force in government and society. Without that leadership
no statute, no constitutional provision will improve or strengthen the
legislative process.
LENGTH OF

SESSIONS

Traditionally American state legislative sessions have been biennial with a constitutionally fixed date for convening, a session of
fixed length or, alternatively, fixed compensation for legislators on
the assumption that for lack of funds they will adjourn and go home
in a reasonable length of time.6 All of these provisions reflect popular
and historic distrust of legislators and legislatures. Yet as Luce observed three decades ago:
Putting on a time limit is perhaps the most preposterous
device men ever conceived for the remedy of political ills.
No railroad, banking, or manufacturing corporation would
be so silly as to try to improve an inefficient directorate by a
vote compelling directors' meetings to adjourn after two
hours or restricting such meetings to two months in the
year ....

In the ordinary affairs of life when we find work is

not being thorough done, we demand that more time and
thought and energy shall be put into the work. That is
precisely what we should demand of men who undertake to
7
legislate for us.

'"In 1946 only six states-California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island and South Carolina-employed annual sessions. By 1953, four additional states-Arizona, Colorado, Maryland and Michigan-had instituted the annual
session, and the trend was continuing. Twenty state legislatures in 1952-53 considered the matter; . . ." Legislative Reorganization Since World War 1I, 27 STATE

GOV'T 33 (1954).

See also a table on the length of sessions, 10 COUNCIL OF STATE

GOVERNMENT,
BOOK OF THE STATrS 106-107
7

(1954-1955).
LucE, LECtSLATIVE ASSEMBLIES 145 (1924).
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Colorado and a number of other states have in response to increasing governmental demands amended their constitutions to provide for
annual sessions, with the session in even numbered years limited to
bills "raising revenue, those making appropriations, and those designated in writing by the Governor during the first ten days of the
It is too soon to judge whether these annual sessions will
session."
result in better consideration of the problems of state, more carefully
prepared legislation, or whether any effect upon the legislative process
will result.
Other methods of extending the session are possible. Much work
can be done immediately prior to the convening of the session. Interim
committees can work continuously from the adjournment of one session until the convening of another.9 These activities presumably can
be extended without constitutional amendment. Although bills are
customarily introduced by legislators they usually are prepared by
others. Indeed, historically, bills presented to the Curia Regis, were
almost always presented by non-members. Colorado, with a long
tradition of popular legislation through the initiative and referendum, 10 would not find the idea so foreign to its tradition as would
many states. Such bills could be presented during the month preceding a legislative session to the clerk of the appropriate house or to a
special interim committee on assignment. As soon as the house was
organized, bills could be read by title and assigned to committee, and
if the house so desired a week or more of legislative time might be
saved. Committee work could begin immediately. Luce recommended a somewhat similar practice, observing that it was as foolish for
a legislature to convene without prelimiary work as it would be for a
manufacturer to call his employees to work before he had procured his
raw materials."
Much of the committee work on important bills not only could
be done, but should be done, by interim committees in advance of the
legislative session. But neither this nor pre-introduction and assignment will succeed unless the legislature and the people are willing
to support it.
PROCEDURE

Although rules of procedure contribute but little to the quality
of the legislative product, they are necessary for the orderly and
efficient operation of a legislative body. They are intended to insure
§ 7 (1950 Amend.).
9"The committees of the general assembly, unless otherwise provided by the
general assembly, shall expire on the convening of the first regular session after a
general election." COLO. CONST. Art. V, § 7, as amended, COLO. CONST. Art. V, § 7
(1950).
1
COLO. CONsT. Art. V, § 1 (1876).
'COLO. CONST. Art. V,

"LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 66 (1922).
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fair treatment of the minority, prevent hasty and ill-considered enactment, and require the maintenance of a record for public inspection.
Most legislative bodies adopt their own rules for the furtherance of
these objectives. Nevertheless, there is a constant demand for constitutional amendments to more fully insure the achievement of these
purposes. The record of constitutional provisions already existing
gives little hope that more constitutional requirements will improve
either the fairness of the legislative process or the quality of its product.
The Colorado constitution contains few constitutional limitations
on procedure. Principally they are: (1) each house shall keep a
journal, 12 (2) bills on introduction shall be read by title and thereafter read at length on two different days in each house unless dispensed with by unanimous consent,' 3 (3) bills must be referred to a
committee, 14 (4) bills must be printed and "all substantial amendments" must be printed before final vote, 1 and (5) the vote on passage
or concurrence in amendments of the other house must be by aye and
16
nay vote entered in the journal.
If the journal requirement is in the nature of a policing device
conferring upon the judiciary a supervisory authority over legislative
procedure, then clearly it is legally the most important constitutional
provision. If on the other hand it is a directive designed only for
the keeping of a record for subsequent political evaluation, then its
legal significance is considerably reduced . State courts have differed
widely on this question, and thus it seems wise to reserve judgment
upon it until the other procedural requirements of the constitution
have been assessed.
Colorado, like most other states, requires that bills be read in
each house during the course of their consideration. The Colorado
provision that a bill may be read by "title only" on introduction is
unusual. 7 There is much to recommend the requirement, however.
In the early Parliaments, with no committee system, it was customary
to present a petition requesting that a bill be introduced. Then the
whole house considered whether it wished to accept the bill. Thus,
the reading of the entire bill was necessary. Today, however, no consideration of a bill occurs on introduction. It is assigned immediately
to committee. Consequently, if any reading on introduction is justified, reading the title of the bill certainly is sufficient.
The Houses of Congress have adopted the practice that introduction and first reading is accomplished by delivering a bill to the clerk.
2COLO. CONST. Art. V, § 13 (1876).
"Id., § 22.
4
1d., § 20.
"Id., § 20 and 22 (1950 Amend.).
"Id., § 23.
"For constitutional provisions in other states see 1
STRUCTION

§ 903 (3d ed. 1943).

SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY CON-
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This practice is desirable where bills are printed automatically upon
introduction. The reading requirement, a necessity when literacy even
among legislators was low, now serves only as a delaying device to
assure that those in opposition have an opportunity to recall their
members from committee meetings, organize their forces and prepare
for crucial voting. This objective is, however, more effectively assured
by the calendar practices of all legislatures. The three reading requirement has outlived its usefulness, and where permitted by the constitution, and even where it is not, it is dispensed with by the consent of
the members.18
The requirement that a bill be printed is the modern version of
the reading requirement. Indeed if it were not for the procedural
delays that the reading requirements achieve, it might well be argued
that the printing of the bill satisfies the constitutional requirement
of "reading."
Although the Colorado constitution requires that the bill be
printed1 9 and that "all substantial amendments" be printed 20 prior
to final vote, it merely confirms the practice of all legislative bodies.
Without constitutional requirements most legislatures for their own
convenience not only print bills upon introduction, but order a
second and third printing if the bill is important and is changed
substantially in the course of enactment. Not only in the case of
printing but in many other procedural matters the legislatures have
established standards of order, responsibility, and fairness far beyond
the constitutional necessities.
The Colorado constitution also requires that bills be assigned to
committee. 2 ' This is the universal practice with or without constitutional direction. The enforcement of its purpose is impossible without the acquiescence of the legislature. Assignment to committee and
reporting back to the house can take but a few minutes if that is the
desire of the house. Assignment in other words does not guarantee
careful study, an opportunity for public hearing, and full committee
consideration. This requirement is as futile as those requiring the
committee to report every bill back to the house. It is similar to the
"COLO. CONST. Art. V, § 22 (1950 Amend.) : "Every bill shall be read by title
when introduced, and at length on two different days in each house; provided,
however, any reading at length may be dispensed with upon unanimous consent
of the members present." Cf. Rules of Colo. Senate, 39th Gen. Assembly, Rule XI
(1953) : "Unless a member shall request the reading of a bill in full when the bill
is being considered ly the Committee of the Whole or on Third and Final Reading,
it shall be read by title only, and the unanimous consent of the members present
to dispense with the reading of the bill in full shall be presumed."
"See note 15 supra. See also Rules of Colo. Senate, 39th Gen. Assembly, Rule
XXI (4) (1953) ; Rules of Colo. H.R., 39th Gen. Assembly, Rule XXX (1953).
'See note 16 supra. See Rules of Colo. Senate, 39th Gen. Assembly, Rule
XXIV (1953); Rules of Colo. H.R. 39th Gen. Assembly, Rule XXIX (1953). What
is "substantial" is a judicial question. In re House Bill No. 250, 20 Colo. 234, 57
Pac. 49 (1899).
2See note 14 supra.
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constitutional provisions that judges shall prepare written opinions.
The writing of opinions can be required, but the constitutional fiat
does not insure that judges will write good opinions.
One constitutional provision of real merit requires a yea
and nay vote recorded in the journal both on final passage and on
concurrence to amendments adopted in the other house.2 2 Although
the judicial enforcement of this provision may raise delicate problems,
its basic postulate is indisputable. It insures the electorate that its
representatives can be held accountable for their individual votes.
Accountability to the electorate is the very essence of representative
democracy and the extension of the yea and nay vote to the adoption
of conference committee reports by the 1950 Colorado amendment is
to be commended. The principle of "stand up and be counted" is
the cornerstone of responsible government.
The enforcement of these constitutional provisions by the courts
has raised delicate problems of inter-departmental relations. If the
courts are to affirmatively police legislative procedure, delve into
every legislative decision, survey every legislative record, they will indeed take over a great share of the legislative function. They will
in effect have a veto more powerful than that of the governor, for
there is no over-riding. But it is argued that if judicial review of
legislative procedure is not provided, then the constitution will be a
dead letter and the legislature will be uncontrolled.2 3 This argument
of course assumes that the legislators do not take their constitutional
oath seriously, that legislators are knaves and fools, that as an institution the legislature is irresponsible. The record belies this conclusion. In the "enrolled bill" states where the courts refuse to look
behind the signatures of the presiding officers to determine whether
the constitutional procedures have been followed, there is no evidence
that the legislative process is less responsible than it is in the states
which follow the "journal entry rule."
Colorado falls between these two groups with a rule founded in
part on the "extrinsic evidence" theory and in part on the "affirmative contradiction" rule, 24 that is, unless the journal shows "affirmatively" that the constitutional requirements have not been complied
with, the presumption is that the bill has been properly enacted. None
of the rules guarantee compliance with the constitution. The clerks
'See note 16 supra. And the rule has been strictly enforced by the courts.
People ex rel. Manville v. Leddy, 53 Colo. 109, 123 Pac. 824 (1912) ; In re Roberts,
5 Colo. 525 (1881); Fry, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Procedure in
Colorado, 3 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 28 (1930).
"To so hold would leave the constitutional requirements touching the mode of
passing bills, binding only in conscience upon members of the legislature." In re
Roberts, 5 Colo. 525, 529, 530 (1881). Cf. Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce,
121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d 498 (1950).
2'See 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 1404, 1405 (3d ed. 1943).
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who prepare the journal, or the presiding officers who certify that
the bill has duly passed can falsify the record, act negligently, or fail
25
to make proper entries.
The journal entry rule and its deviates have merely given gratuitous causes of action to those who have not been injured, and do
not even allege that they have been injured by failures to comply
with constitutional procedure, but who object to the substance of the
legislation enacted.
Where the plaintiff relies upon a failure to comply with constitutionally required legislative procedure but cannot show that he,
or anyone in the same class, has been injured, it is difficult to understand why legislative policy should be defeated by declaring the Act
unconstitutional. Courts have recognized this when the constitutional
attack has come many years after the statute was enacted. 2 6 Time
should not be the only criterion of validity. Professor Freund proposed that a short statute of limitations should be imposed on such
litigation. 27 New Jersey gives the governor, or two interested citizens,
a one year period in which to assert constitutional procedural violations. 2

8

Other limitations might require the action to be brought

by a legislator who voted against the bill or by a person who could
prove injury by the legislature's failure to comply with the constitutional procedure. Such limitation would restrict litigation to those
who were actually harmed. Even actions by legislators might be
excluded on the ground that they raised political issues better corrected
at the polls than in the courts. Judicial enforcement of these constitutional requirements is more likely to create rather than alleviate
legislative problems, as the Supreme Court discovered in Christoffel v.
29
United States.
Many desirable improvements in legislative procedure may be
achieved without constitutional amendment. Perhaps the most im'This is not to suggest that clerks would in fact act in this manner, but rather
to emphasize that if a hostile attitude is taken toward the legislative process then
hypothetical instances may be surmised that would require a withdrawal of confidence from anyone connected with the legislative process. Anyone acquainted
with political responsibility and political ambition knows that what is conjecturally
possible is realistically restrained by the future political aims of the participants.
'Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441, 36 Pac. 221 (1894); Meister v. Carbaugh, 310
I1. 486, 142 N.E. 189 (1923); Cameron v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 63 Minn. 384, 65
N.W. 652 (1896); Weston v. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 N.W. 347 (1903); Mitchell v.
Campbell, 19 Ore. 198, 24 Pac. 455 (1890); Notes, 34 COL. L. REV. 1495 (1934); 48
HARV. L. REV. 988 (1935).
"FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 156 (1917); see Note, 39 W. VA.
L. Q. 70, 75 (1932).
'N.J. Acts 1873, c. 116; N.J. REV. STAT. § 1:7 (1937); N.J. REV. STAT. § 1:7
(Cum. Supp. 1950). In re Public Utility Board, 83 N.J.L. 303, 307, 84 Atl. 706, 708
(1912); In re Low, 88 N.J.L. 28, 95 Aft. 616 (1915); Grant, New Jersey's 'Popular
Action' In Rem to control Legislative Procedure, 4 RUTCERS L. REV. 381 (1950).
1338 U.S. 84 (1949); reversed in effect by United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323
(1950), wherein Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, said "It is plain we are not following the Christoffel decision and so I think we should candidly over-rule it."
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portant suggestion is to keep the calendar of the two houses open from
session to session. It has always been assumed that upon adjournment
the legislature was dead. The fear of Parliament by the English
Crown made this a convenient philosophy. The lack of business for
continuous sessions certainly justified this postulate during our early
history. The result has been that all bills pending at adjournment
failed, and if they are to be considered at a following session they must
be reintroduced.
A similar rule once applied to the courts, but today all civil
matters pending before a court continue from session to session until
they are disposed of, withdrawn, or dismissed. A great deal of lost
legislative motion-reintroduction, reassignment to committee, rehearing-would be avoided if the judicial practice was adopted by the
legislatures. The Supreme Court of the United States strongly hinted
in the Pocket Veto Cases that at least between sessions of the same
Congress no pocket veto would result if the houses of Congress kept
their calendars open and bills remained on the calendar of the second
session at the same place they were on the adjournment of the first
session.3 0 The new Georgia constitution specifically authorizes its
legislature to continue the calendar after adjournment but within the
same session.3 1 To date legislative assemblies have been reluctant to
accept these invitations. Perhaps tradition is too strong, but there
are no specific constitutional obstacles to this practice. Its adoption
would save a great deal of legislative time, remove the expense of reintroduction and reprinting of bills previously introduced, and
would correct the popular impression that all bills introduced at a
given legislative session were "new."
The practice would create the danger that bills having completed
all the legislative steps at a previous session except third reading and
vote might be hastily passed at the next session without sufficient
deliberation and consideration. But when thorough reconsideration is
necessary at a succeeding session it hardly can be assumed that a
motion to re-commit for further committee consideration would not
receive a favorable vote. If necessary consideration was not given,
the governor might veto the bill in order to insure adequate deliberation.
The "open calendar" system has worked well in the judicial department. It has much to recommend it in legislative procedure, but
it will not succeed unless legislators want it to succeed. Its policy may
be defeated either by disposing adversely of all matters pending at
8Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis, Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes
or Bands of the State of Washington v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1928). But
see Note
51 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1938).
81
GA. CONST. § 2-1603 (1945): "All business pending in the Senate or House
at the adjournment of any regular session may be considered at any later regular
session of the same General Assembly as if there had been no adjournment."
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the end of a session or by refraining from calling from the calendar
matters pending before a prior session.
The place of the committee system in legislative procedure has
received the greatest attention from those who wish to improve the
legislative process. Generally these proposals have recommended a
reduction in the number of committees in each house or the estab32
lishment of a joint committee organization.
Traditionally every legislator is "entitled" to membership on at
least one committee, and in some states, to be chairman of one committee. Neverthleless, a relatively few committees do the lion's share of
the work. The elimination of committees that do not meet and have
no bills referred to them will have no actual effect on legislative procedure. The selective reduction in the number of "major" committees
would have the undesirable effect of placing greater power in a
33
smaller number of committee chairmen.
Ideally, the establishment of a joint committee system is desirable.
It substitutes a single hearing for dual hearings and thus reduces the
burden on individual legislators. It achieves a kind of unicameralism
without losing the advantages of bicameral organization. 3 4 It saves
time for lobbyists, witnesses, and administrators. But it is a proposal
that seems doomed to failure, because it challenges the independence
of each house. If the senate is given equal representation on joint
committees, its position in relation to the house is too dominant. If
the senatorial representation is proportionate to the size of the senate,
its position is one of perpetual minority.
Although the committee system has become the heart of the
American legislative process, little has been done to adjust procedure
to its importance. This is particularly true in the state legislatures
where limited sessions seldom give committees adequate time to do
their work. In from four to seven weeks they must hold hearings,
interrogate witnesses, evaluate evidence, and make their reports. The
more important the committee, the more probable it is that its membership is composed at least in part of legislators who are also members of other important committees. Thus meetings are difficult to
schedule and full attendance is almost impossible.
The extremely short time within which committees can operate,
together with the lack of the seniority system, may account for the
relatively ineffective work of state legislative committees as compared
'"Too many committees, it has been pointed out, result in conflicts of meetings,
inadequate notice and publicity of hearings, and assignment of individual legislators
to more committees than they can serve effectively."
Legislative Reorganization
Since World War II, 27 STATE Gov'T 33, 34 (1954).
13Woodrow Wilson characterized our government as "a government by the
chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress." In general see I SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C. 10 (3d ed. 1943).
MHorack, Bicameral Legislatures are Effective, 14 STATE GOV'T 79 (1941).
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with those of Congress. Another contributing factor is the smaller
number of state representatives. The number of important committees in the average state legislature is about the same as in Congress;
but the number of representatives in the average state is about onesixth the number in the federal House of Representatives; and state
senators are only about one-third as numerous as those in the United
States Senate. The significance is in the quorum requirements. Legislatures hesitate to recess for fear their constituents will think that they
are not working; nor do they like to hold daily sessions with the floors
of the two houses nearly deserted. In consequence much committee
work is not done at all, hurriedly done, or done in the evenings under
surroundings less than judicial, in order that a semblance of a program
on the floor of the two houses can be presented. In an attempt to keep
both the committees and a house calendar functioning, legislators
subject themselves to greater mental and physical strain than any other
group of public officials. For this the legislators have themselves to
blame. They must educate the public to the fact that half-day sessions,
frequent recesses, or the split legislative session 8 is necessary if the
committee system is to have the time necessary for its work.
THE LEGISLATIVE PRODUCT

The character and amount of legislation enacted by a legislature
depends primarily upon its evalutaion of the legislative function. The
constitution, of course, prohibits legislative intervention in some
fields,8 6 but essentially the character of the statutes is determined
more by the legislative judgment of what it should do than by the
constitutional limitations on what it cannot do.
In assessing the legislature's discharge of its responsibility, lawyers
too frequently consider only the constitutional obligations and the
private law, just as the political scientists tend to overweigh the
importance of governmental organization and procedure. Both must
be considered because ultimately it is the legislature which is responsible for the achievement of satisfactory social, economic, and
political conditions within the state.
'The purpose of the split session was to permit introduction of bills in the
first half of the session so that the legislators could return home and determine
the will of their constituents. This objective was not achieved, but the device
would be invaluable to the proper functioning of the modern committee system.
To be effective, however, bills could not be introduced or substantially amended in
the second session. Colorado already has such provisions. CoLo. CONsT. Art. V,
§ 17 (no alteration in original objective), Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d 498 (1950); COLO. CONST. Art. V, § 19, as amended,
CoLo. CONST. Art, V, § 19 (1959) (no introduction by title only).
"le., Civil rights, ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and all provisions intended to protect the individual against the action of government. Other limitations are placed on subject matter in an attempt to improve legislative efficiency
and responsibility-principally prohibitions on special legislation, appropriation
and revenue measures, and the grant of public funds.
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If the legislative attitude is passive, that is, it will consider only
those proposals which are submitted to it, then there will be no legislative leadership; and unless the governor comes forward with a program there will be no leadership at all. Affirmative exercise of responsibility requires that the legislature inform itself on the entire
state of the law, both public and private, determine whether the laws
are being faithfully executed, whether the administrative personnel
is competent, whether the judicial system is adequate, and whether
the political subdivisions of the state are functioning properly. It is
because the Congress of the United States so interprets its constitutional obligation that it has been a more powerful force in the national
government than the legislatures have been in the states. In general
state legislatures have exhausted their time and personnel on legislation of limited importance and have delegated uncritically to administrative agencies and to political subdivisions extensive legislative
power on the assumption that by such delegation they discharge their
obligation and thus escape further responsibility. No conclusion could
be more erroneous. Only if the delegation produces results satisfactory to society is the obligation satisfied.
A society judges government in terms of its programs and their
enforcement. Thus, if municipalities receive power but not the
financial ability to act, or having both, they do not act, the responsibility remains with the legislature. The electors think in terms of
highway programs, new school legislation, mental health proposals,
laws relating to agriculture, labor, mining, public assistance. Only
if the enactment of the law produces the expected consequences are
they satisfied that their government is performing its function.
These larger issues always involve taxation and the disbursement
of revenue. Every legislator knows that the real pressures come both
from those who pay the taxes and from those who benefit by the
disbursements. Generally state legislatures have been convinced that
the pressures for lower taxes are more powerful than those for great
governmental expenditures. Congress has made the opposite assumption. It has operated on the principle that society will not resist taxation if the money is spent for the governmental goods which a majority
of society wants. The consequences of this assumption have alarmed
a great many people. They point particularly to the concentration
of power in Washington. Not infrequently this concentration of
power has been more the consequence of state inaction than of affirmative federal action. Adequate provision for residential housing is
a case in point. After World War I every city was faced with terrific
housing shortages. Only a few states provided, or authorized their
municipalities to provide, low cost public-financed housing. Even
fewer provided cities with the necessary financial power. As a result,

26 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW

(1954)

cities and many of the very citizens who oppose centralization used all
37
their efforts to get the federal government into the housing business.
New relationships between the federal government and the citizens
were created which seriously challenge the position of the states,
primarily because the states would not affirmatively meet the expectations of their people.
For legislators to be popular or for legislatures to discharge their
duty it is not necessary that they engage in large scale give-away programs. Far from it. But they must not ignore the vast changes that
have occurred in rural and urban living. They cannot assume that
a little patch-work on the "cities and towns laws" and a few special
acts for the counties will take the place of a wholesale re-examination
of local government in its modern setting.
This is but one of many areas where state legislatures have failed
to act. The legislature cannot be tested by the form of the statutes it
39
The legislative product must be the
enacts, 3 8 or by their number.

composite of many things: sound preparation of data; adequate public
hearing to test the popular sentiment; excellence in drafting; sanctions
sufficient to achieve the policy; legislative interest in the achievement
of its policy; and a willingness to study, investigate and enact addi40
tional legislation until the objective is actually achieved. In short,
the legislative product is not the statute but the results the statute
produces.
RECORDS
Better record keeping seldom has been suggested as a means of
improving the legislative process, yet it is probably the most meritor'The movement, of course, began during the last year of President Hoover's
administration when he proposed and Congress enacted The Emergency Relief and
Construction Act of 1932. Although public housing is not directly involved in the
current Senate investigation of the F.H.A., the investigation discloses that Congress,
unlike most state legislatures, seriously undertakes the discharge of its Constitutional
responsibility to see that "the laws be faithfully executed." See SEN. RES. 214, 229,
authorizing the investigation and appropriating $250,000 for its conduct. 100
CONG. REC. 4952-3 (83d Cong. 2d Sess., April 19, 1954).
3Statutory form may contribute, nevertheless, importantly to the effectiveness
of the law. A poorly drafted law, however, may be effective if it receives vigorous
administration and general public support. But drafting remains an important and
neglected area.
'"The effect of the introduction of a large number of bills in producing illIf we take from
considered and inadequate legislation is probably exaggerated ....
the statutes passed the local and special acts and the appropriation acts, the criticism
which can be usually made as to the residue is not so much its volume, but that
much of it shows, entirely apart from the wisdom of the policy which it is desired
to express, the haste with which the statute was prepared and the lack of consideration given to the adequacy of its provisions to effectuate its purpose." Report of
the Special Committee on Legislative Drafting, 38 A.B.A. REP. 622, 631 (1913).
'""Independence in any organization is isolation; and isolation is weakness....
It is an interesting conclusion in political dynamics that a body which stands jealously
apart and avoids partnership of any intimate sort in the conduct of affairs, declines
the opportunity to rule and gets only an opportunity to bargain. If it is strong
enough to rule, partnership will bring it supremacy; if it is not strong enough to
rule, it can make little out of compromises and bargains." WOODROW WILSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 101 (1907).
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ious proposal. Every lawyer is aware of the importance of records to the
judicial process. They provide the basis upon which the profession and
the public judge the success and failure of the courts. Nothing comparable exists in the state legislative system.
In Congress the Congressional Record, the full printed transcripts
of committee hearings, the carefully prepared majority and minority
committee reports, the Statutes at Large, and the United States Code
provide complete and accurate records of every important legislative
activity. Their controlling effect in federal litigation is in sharp contrast to the ill-concealed contempt with which some state courts have
treated their legislative products.
In most states only house journals and session laws are published.
A few have official or semi-official codes. The journals are minimum
records of motions made, amendments passed and failed, and yea
and nay votes recorded. Floor debates are seldom printed. Except
in two or three states committee hearings and committee reports are
never printed. It is little wonder then that state legislatures are
generally ignored.
The existence of complete records would have many salutary
effects on the state legislative process, Accurate committee reports
would give a more reliable basis for legislative action. The printed
reports and hearings would refute much of the folklore which currently circulates concerning undue influence brought to bear upon the
committees. Complete reporting of debates would support the political sanction of recording the yea and nay vote in the journal. In
short, record keeping by the legislature would ultimately produce the
same responsibility which it has created in the courts and with responsibility would come respect for the legislative process.
Objections will of course be made to complete record keeping.
Printing costs will be substantial. Reporting and secretarial services
must be increased both in quantity and quality. With a printed record
the need for expert assistance, committee counsel, economic advisers,
technical experts will greatly increase. But this is merely another way
of saying that the legislature and the public are now receiving an
inferior product.
Although an improved product will be more costly, it may well
be worth the price. The printed record will encourage committees
to demand and to receive the type of information and data which
special interest groups can provide. The legislation ultimately enacted
will be founded not upon conjecture but upon the most reliable information available. The people primarily through the press, radio,
and television will have a much more effective control over their
representatives for the "bare bones" of their actions will be constantly
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available for public scrutiny. The statutory product should be more
reliable and unnecessary litigation thereby reduced.
Thus the one change most likely to improve both legislative procedure and the legislative product is record keeping. It will not be
automatic. Constitutional amendment will not insure success. It must
come as a matter of legislative pride and tradition. Legislators themselves must assume the leadership necessary to make complete records
successful. They must educate the public to its importance. They
must resist the fear that they will be criticized because of expense.
Congress has kept complete records for three-quarters of a century
and no effective movement has ever challenged it for such practice.
Many improvements in state legislative procedure are possible:
pre-session introduction of bills, interim study committees, preservation of the calendar from session to session, and limitation on the
areas of legislative enactment. However, none of these are as important
or as easily achieved as returning the legislature to its original position
as a court of record.

